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Abstract 
This chapter examines the strategic development of the performance management, external 
inspection and intervention regimes developed by central government for delivered public 
services in England between 1999 and 2010. It then looks at their subsequent experience under 
the coalition government since the general election in 2010.  
During the previous government’s tenure between 1997 and 2010, there was considerable 
evidence of increasingly ‘strategic’ central state action in relation to locally delivered public 
services. However under the present government this development has given way to a less 
coherent approach as the coalition has prioritized short and medium term reductions in public 
expenditure over public service improvements and promoted market based responses to public 
service reform. 
This chapter initially describes the Labour years but also attempts to explain some of the 
conceptual confusions and apparent inconsistencies in more recent policy proposals for locally 
delivered public services from the coalition government. It draws out lessons that should 
inform future government interventions, in developing a longer term and more strategic 
response to the financial crises and the management and sustainability of locally delivered 
public services.   
Key 
Introduction and background  
The inspection of public services in the UK by agencies of central government dates back at 
least as far as the early nineteenth century. 
“The first inspectors of schools were established under the Factories Act of 1833 with the 
power to establish schools for children working in the factories. The role developed into an 
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inspection function to gather information and report back to the government on the 
implementation of education clauses of legislation.” (Martin 2008 p. 52.) 
Following the factories inspectorates, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary was established 
in 1856, and there were a further plethora of inspectorates, including the Social Services 
Inspectorate, established after the Second World War. However the key foundations of the 
development of strategic intervention by the modern UK state came with the establishment of 
the Audit Commission in 1983 (Campbell-Smith 2008). This gradually provided regular national 
performance statistics, external audits, independent inspections and national operational 
research reports that became the core of the evidential base upon which the performance 
management regimes and the strategic interventions of the Labour administrations from 1997-
2010 were built.   
The strategic state. 
A key milestone in the development of Labours early approach to the reform of both central 
and local government was the publication of  the Modernising Government white paper in 1999  
(Cabinet Office 1999). This set out a long term programme for public service improvement and 
attempted to adopt a strategically planned approach. To ensure its vision was both inclusive 
and integrated it specifically adopted three aims:- 
 Ensuring that policy making was more joined up and strategic 
 Ensuring that public service users, not providers, were the focus of services; and 
 Delivering public services that were high quality and efficient. 
Following the 2001 election, and in order to drive the delivery of this long term vision, the 
government established three powerful new policy units and co-located them at the centre of 
Government in the Cabinet Office and in No 10 Downing Street. 
The Office of Public Service Reform was headed by the former head of the Audit Commissions’ 
Best Value Inspectorate, Wendy Thompson; the Prime Ministers Delivery Unit was led by 
Michael Barber, the former Director of Standards and Effectiveness at the Education 
Department and the Forward Strategy Unit was headed by Geoff Mulgan, previously the 
Director of the Performance and Innovatory Unit at the Treasury. This powerful triumpherite 
was co-ordinated from 2001 by the Director of Communication and Strategy, Alastair Campbell. 
These units had, as one of their collective functions, the stewardship of the modernisation 
agenda in central and local government and, their primary role was to ensure policy and 
programmes at both national and local levels were working symbiotically to deliver the 
government’s vision.   Their collective objective was therefore to co-ordinate and facilitate the 
delivery of the government’s vision for improving public services at national and local levels, 
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which has strong resonances with the recent OECD definition of the strategic state shown in 
Box 1 below. One systemic way they achieved this objective was through the establishment of 
national Public Service Agreements (between government spending departments and the 
centre of government), the targets and objectives of which, were then translated into 
successive generations of the top down performance management regimes that evaluated the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery to local communities (Mulgan 2009, 
Barber 2012, Joyce 2012).  







The development of performance assessment regimes 1999-2010 
The Local Government Act 1999 required 'best value authorities' (including local councils, the 
police, and fire and rescue authorities) to facilitate continuous improvement in the way all of 
their functions, services or activities were exercised, as measured by their economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness. In order to ensure this was achieved the government established the Best 
Value Inspectorate within the Audit Commission in April 2000, and this gradually led to the 
development of a system of increasingly sophisticated and co-ordinated performance 
management regimes to assess the performance and delivery of local public services (Downe 
2008). 
These performance management regimes were mandatory and increasingly comprehensive and 
were, to a large extent, based upon independently audited performance indicators and targets, 
established by government in consultation with local delivery partners with generic definitions 
and standards allowing benchmarking and comparative analysis of performance both 
geographically and, to an extent, historically.     
Under the 1999 Act councils were required to carry out best value reviews of all their services 
over a five year period from 2000 to 2005. The reviews were expected to help councils identify 
how they could improve their services and the Audit Commission was given responsibility for 
carrying out inspections of best value reviews. Between April 2000 to November 2003 the Audit 
"To put in place and effective strategic management system, central agencies must act as a central 
leadership hub in order to facilitate co-ordination, collaboration and co-operation across the public 
administration, with the objective of securing a strong, coherent and collective strategic vision of 
where the country needs to go and how it will get there. Centres of Government are the focal point 
for the strategic state and are essential for leadership, steering, stewardship, oversight and 
accountability." 




Commission carried out 1,664 inspections and after each inspection, it published a report 
scoring the quality of the service and the prospects for improvement. 
Throughout this time the commissions’ audits and inspections were complemented by 
independent inspections of individual services or groups of services such as social services, 
education, housing services, benefit services etc. carried out by other specialist pre-existing 
inspectorates (Davis and Martin 2008). Prior to 2002, the Best Value and other inspection 
regimes were primarily service inspection regimes and were the responsibility of designated 
individual Inspectorates. The inspectorates reported almost exclusively to their respective 
sponsoring central government department or agency e.g. Ofsted reported to the Department 
of Children Schools and Families; Social Service Inspection to the Department of Health; HMI 
Constabulary, HMI Probation and HMI Prisons to the Home Office; Benefit Fraud Inspectorate 
to the Department of Works and Pensions and HM Fire Inspectorate and the Housing 
Inspectorate to the Department of Transport, Local Government and Regions.  
From 2000 onwards the performance management regimes were also complemented by Local 
Public Service Agreements (LPSA) which were directly negotiated contract based agreements 
between central and local government, in which local authorities were encouraged to meet 
agreed “stretching” improvement targets for individual services in exchange for both financial 
rewards and/or freedoms from bureaucratic or legislative burdens. Initially these LPSAs were 
agreements between central government and individual local authorities in which the latter 
could call on the help of local delivery partners such as the police or the health service for 
delivery of objectives, but only the local authority could enjoy the benefits (Sullivan and 
Gillanders 2006).  
In 2001 the government also asked the Audit Commission to initiate a programme of 14 pilot 
Corporate Governance Inspections in local authorities that assessed their corporate 
performance and quality of governance. The 14 pilots were not chosen at random and included 
a number of authorities recognised as, or suspected of having, significantly poor performance 
and/or governance issues. This programme was intended to develop a corporate inspection 
process or model to complement the service inspection processes referred to above, and to 
become part of the next generation of performance management regimes for local government, 
known as Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPA).  
The 2002 CPA regime in local government, which was followed in health by the Standards for 
Better Health (S4BH) in 2004, developed both corporate and service assessments for Local 
Authorities and NHS Health Trusts and co-ordinated them into performance frameworks or 
regimes designed to assess them as both corporate organisations and as collections of services 
delivered to the public. Later there were also equivalent regimes developed later in criminal 
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justice, national parks etc. but the most influential regimes were undoubtedly those in local 
government.   
A second generation of LPSAs implemented in 2004, while still negotiated between central and 
local government were based exclusively on local rather than central priorities. They had a 
stronger emphasis on impacts and long term outcomes for local communities and most 
importantly involved local delivery partners such as criminal justice, health, and the third sector 
organisations to both collaboratively develop the programme, but also to benefit from the 
rewards (Sullivan and Gillanders 2006).      
Learning the lessons from LPSAs and the first rounds of CPA, a second more comprehensive 
CPA regime was developed after 2005 which concentrated not only on the economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness of the authorities, but also looked at their impact on communities and hence 
how effectively councils were performing in certain statutory partnerships, such as the crime 
and disorder reduction partnerships and in local discretionary partnerships such as those 
designed to promote regeneration or development of the local economy. They also took a more 
direct interest in the political governance and leadership of the organisation and of the wider 
local public service community than the first generations of CPA.    
At around the same time the second generation LPSAs and the development of Local Area 
Agreements (LAAs) had also encouraged multi-agency working within coterminous local 
authority areas.  Subsequently the 2007 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health 
Act enshrined this collaborative working within a new performance management regime 
entitled Comprehensive Area Assessments (with LAAs at their centre) implemented from 2009, 
under an initiative known as One Place (Audit Commission 2010). A common and more 
strategic approach was also taken to the multi-agency or inter-agency use of public resources 
with the transfer of costs to other public authorities no longer counted as efficiency gains, and 
the new Use of Resources Assessments (Audit Commission 2008) using the same assessment 
methodology for local authorities Primary Care Trusts Police and Fire and Rescue Authorities. At 
the same time Multi-Area Agreements encouraged wider cross boundary geographical 
collaborations on long term issues such as transportation and economic regeneration.  
State Intervention in underperforming local services 1999-2010.  
Section 15 of the 1999 Act gave the Secretary of State powers to direct the authority to take 
‘any action which he considers necessary or expedient’ to ensure its compliance with the 
requirements of the Act to secure continuous improvement. This gave the Secretary of State far 
greater and more widespread powers to intervene in poorly performing authorities or services 
than historically had been afforded to Secretaries of State or auditors in previous services such 
as education, social services or benefits fraud. 
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Although the government, local authorities, the NHS and other local service delivery 
organisations, developed improvement agencies and other initiatives to help build capacity and 
capabilities within the public services, the key strategic initiative was the development of the 
intervention arrangements in the most significantly and demonstrably underperforming or 
‘failing’ local delivery organisations. Once again the approach was initially developed in relation 
to local authorities, with later variants developed in Health, Criminal Justice, Fire and Rescue 
and other services. In all of these sectors  ‘support and intervention’ or ‘failure and recovery’ 
arrangements were established as part of the wider performance management regimes,  by 
which the state directly intervened to help facilitate the turnaround or recovery of the most 
significantly underperforming or poorly performing services and authorities.    
As with assessment and inspection, prior to the Best Value regime, government action or 
intervention was based upon failure of individual services such as education, social services or 
benefit fraud or as the result of a scandal in a particular authority.  Although the external 
auditors could issue Public Interest Reports under the Audit Acts, the history, cost and duration 
of these investigations, and the cost and duration of previous service interventions, meant the 
government had to look at an alternative regime. At around the same time the Audit 
Commission was engaged on 14 Corporate Governance Inspections and quickly came to the 
view that some of the authorities they were reviewing were performing so poorly that they 
were reluctant to wait until they finished their inspections before acting. Consequently they 
referred some of the authorities to the Secretary of State under the provisions of the 1999 Act. 
As a result 3 pilot ‘engagements’ were instituted with Walsall, Kingston-upon-Hull and 
Rossendale in July 2002, prior to the CPA regime itself being implemented.       
The new approach was to ask 3 individual members of the DTLRs Local Government 
Performance Unit to become ‘Lead Officials’ and act as Chairman of Government Monitoring 
Boards on behalf of all the government departments with an interest in local government 
service delivery. These lead officials reported directly to a nominated minister who was 
responsible for keeping all Whitehall departments informed. The three lead officials chosen 
were all previously experienced senior local authority officials who had recently been brought 
into central government as part of the Local Government Modernisation Team.  
The model that was developed included the development of recovery or improvement plans, 
complemented by capacity building with the support of officer and elected member peers from 
other  authorities and the ability to call on external support and request regular external 
inspection or assessment from the Audit Commission or other inspectorates (ODPM 2003a and 
2003b). This effectively became the model for local government intervention after the first CPA 
results were announced in December 2002.  
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Although this arrangement was initially strongly resisted by both the individual local authorities 
and the Local Government Association, the appointment of the 13 Lead Officials, all of whom 
came from experienced and distinguished local authority backgrounds, and the rapid success of 
the recoveries in some of the most stubbornly underperforming authorities, meant that the 
programme rapidly gained support and effectively informed all other intervention 





Assessment regimes since 2010 
From the beginning of their tenure, the new coalition governments’ primary concern has been 
to reduce public expenditure and the coalition agreement in May 2010 included a commitment 
to end the inspection of local authorities by the Audit Commission. In August the government 
announced the abolition of the Commission and this was quickly followed by what became 
known as the bonfire of the ‘quangos’ or quasi autonomous non-governmental organisations 
but was actually a cull of non-departmental government bodies. This process either abolished, 
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or reduced in size and influence, a lot of the organisations set up as part of the improvement 
infrastructure by the previous governments. In central government they announced the 2010 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) for an extended period of four years but discontinued 
the system of Public Service Agreements between the Treasury and the delivery or ‘spending’ 
departments. These were the agreements through which the CSR targets were established, 
implemented and monitored. They announced that CAA would cease and the three year Local 
Area Agreements would be the last of such agreements. They introduced a new regime known 
as localism and their preference was for sector led self-assessments and improvements as the 
basis or a new performance management regime all of which were welcomed by the 
conservative led LGA.    
In Fire and Rescue they announced a strategic review of the National Fire and Rescue 
Framework and questioned the need for a national framework at all, although paradoxically 
they maintained the new Integrated Risk Management Planning process (IRMP), which was the 
key strategic innovation of the 2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act. The IRMP changed the nature 
of risk assessment in fire services from an assessment based upon buildings and premises to a 
more holistic risk assessment based on the risk to people and communities (Murphy et al 2013). 
Following a statutory public consultation exercise, however, by July 2012 they had been 
persuaded to change their view and were ready to publish a new national framework for fire 
and rescue in England (DCLG 2012b). This actually required more regular reporting of 
performance at both national and local levels than had been the case under the CPA regime 
and was soon supplemented by a national review of potential short-term efficiencies (Knight 
2013).     
It was a similar storey in the NHS where proposals for a top down restructuring of the NHS were 
radically altered, although not completely abandoned, in the course of the longest public 
consultation exercise ever undertaken by a UK government. This resulted in the Health and 
Social Care Act of 2012, some parts of which were a clear continuation and development of the 
strategic approach of the previous government (Murphy 2013), while other parts had little 
strategic coherence (Calkin 2013).  However the government increased the state’s intervention 
powers over health by the creation of the NHS Commissioning Board and, partially in response 
to the Mid Staffordshire Hospitals scandals, strengthened the scope and powers of both the 
Care Quality Commission (CQC), despite widespread criticism of its performance, and, more 
predictably, MONITOR, the financial scrutiny body for Foundation Hospital Trusts.  
A more radical approach has, however, been taken to the police.  A forewarning of this 
appeared in the coalition agreement which stated “we will introduce measures to make the 
police more accountable through oversight by a directly elected individual, who will be subject 
to strict checks and balances by locally elected representatives” and on 15th November 2013 
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the first Police and Crime Commissioners were duly elected albeit with an historically low public 
mandate. Charged with securing efficient and effective policing, they are assisted by Police and 
Crime Panels s consisting of at least one representative from each local authority in that area, 
and at least two independent members co-opted onto the panel. Panels are responsible for 
scrutinizing commissioners' decisions and ensuring relevant performance information is 
available to the public. Commissioners and panels effectively replaced the now abolished police 
authorities.  
The development of Intervention since 2010  
Since 2010 the coalition government’s inspection and intervention arrangements in significantly 
underperforming services and organisations has again been fractured and inconsistent. In 
general terms it has not attempted to assess the evidence of ‘what works’ as its predecessor 
did, nor has it looked at alternative options, in fact there has been a notable dearth of the 
traditional green papers or consultations from the new government.  Wherever possible the 
coalition government has preferred to adopt a policy-based evidence approach rather than an 
evidence-based policy approach, although whenever challenged by public or official scrutiny 
processes this has invariably had to be amended towards a more evidential approach, as was 
the case with the proposals for public health under the 2012 Health and Social Care Act 
referred to above (Murphy 2013). 
At the DCLG Select Committee hearings, which considered the coalition government’s abolition 
of the Audit Commission, both the DCLG and the LGA strongly advocated the sector self-
regulation and peer review approach to performance assessment and the associated, sector led 
intervention. This has been the approach adopted since the last local authority intervention by 
the previous government (Northampton BC) had been confirmed as no longer requiring central 
government strategic support in April 2009. The government has since maintained this sector 
led approach despite the clear scepticism of the DCLG Select Committee (HOC 2011) and of 
academics (Murphy et al 2011). 
“We welcome the LGA's proposals for sector-led performance management. However, they 
suffer from the limitation that they are optional and there is no formal mechanism to identify 
poorly performing local authorities, who may choose not to participate. It remains to be seen 
how vigorously and effectively they are implemented.”  
(House of Commons DCLG Select Committee 4th Report 2011 para 515). 
It is however difficult to unequivocally assess the success of this approach since no individual 
cases have been subjected to independent external scrutiny although the intervention in 
Doncaster MBC, which began in 2010 and is ongoing, has established a public website upon 
which it posts its reports (Doncaster Recovery Board 2013). The intervention ‘model’ this 
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commission is using is however remarkably similar to the previous central government model 
with the lead official replaced by a lead commissioner who was appointed by the Secretary of 
State.  
The coalition government’s attitude to intervention in the Health and Social Care sector has, 
however, been somewhat different, partly because of the emergence of the NHS 
Commissioning Board, with its new role to oversee the NHS as a whole; partly because of the 
Mid Staffordshire Hospital scandal (Francis 2013), and partly because of the continuing financial 
difficulties some foundation hospitals have found themselves in as a result of being burdened 
with large and onerous Public Finance Initiative contracts. Both the powers to intervene, and 
the encouragement from the government to intervene, have increased in this sector and both 
the CQC and MONITOR have had their remits expanded and responsibilities increased despite 
the former, in particular, attracting considerable criticism from both the government and the 
press (People Opportunities Ltd 2013).     
In Fire and Rescue Services the position is also somewhat contradictory. Although the 
government initially proposed to discontinue a national framework, it eventually relented and 
published a new framework in July 2012 (DCLG 2012a). In relation to intervention it then 
proposed continuation of the status quo, through continuation of the previous ‘Section 23 
intervention protocol’ in October 2012 (DCLG 2012b), even though this was generally 
considered by participants and informed commentators to be one of the less sophisticated 
regimes and predated many of the improvements and new techniques that had been made to 
other intervention regimes (Murphy and Greenhalgh 2013). Finally in the police service, it has 
maintained the responsibilities of HMIC to investigate and assess the performance of the 46 
constabularies and other specialist police forces, but in 13 parts of the country has replaced the 
Police Boards with directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners with added scrutiny from 
new Police Panels (Home Office 2011). 
Post 2010 fragmentation 
In retrospect it appears from the published evidence of the Audit Commission and other 
inspectorates, and to a lesser extent from academic research, that throughout the 1997-2010 
period, the central state, in cooperation with local public service delivery organisations, were 
gradually acquiring the capacities and organization to be more effective at local interventions, 
and was becoming increasingly ‘strategic’ in these interventions as they became based upon an 
increasingly robust and comprehensive evidential base, and demonstrably effective practice 
and experience. They also gradually built the necessary infrastructure, organizations and 
networks to promote continual improvement and generate organizational and sectoral 
innovations in public service delivery. The clearest demonstration of this success was contained 
in the detail of each successive Comprehensive Spending Review where central government 
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was able to assume greater economy and efficiency savings would be made by local authorities, 
both individually and collectively, and the Treasury adjusted the annual Local Government 
Financial Settlement accordingly (HMT 2010). In addition the government also set annual 
efficiency targets for individual authorities (not to be confused with the previous assumptions) 
that, although widely resented, were generally and consistently achieved. These were all in 
addition to the Local Area Agreement ‘stretch’ targets for tackling key local priorities. The sheer 
number and complexity of the target arrangements, and audit and compliance culture that 
developed after 2005 had within it the seeds of its own demise. 
It is ironic that in England at the same time as strategic intervention by the central state was 
proving effective, the organisational infrastructure and the evidential base upon which it was 
based was being dismantled. A key part of this loss was the abolition of the Audit Commission, 
which in addition to its national operational research function, had the core responsibility to 
coordinate central state assessments and interventions in individual authorities or areas. The 
Improvement and Development Agency for Local Government was radically reduced and 
consumed within the LGA, and the original proposals for the so called ‘bonfire of the quangos’ 
also proposed that the National Policing Improvement Agency should be closed, (despite being 
the host to the national crime database), and various knowledge bases such as the Public 
Health Observatories scrapped. The governments’ own Regional Office network was closed, 
departmental research capacity was significantly reduced and the budget of the Office for 
National Statistics severely curtailed.  
The coalition government appears to be going back to the pre-1997 situation with a preference 
for the central state determining or setting policy objectives, but not wishing to concern itself, 
debate or consider alternatives about how these policy objectives could or should be achieved. 
In so doing the coalition government have consistently preferred to put their faith in the 
market economy being able to develop or innovate to achieve, what are assumed in advance, 
to be the most appropriate solutions, although at times they accept that the third sector may 
also have a role to play.  However the capacity to systematically produce and quality assure the 
evidence upon which public policy decisions would henceforth be based, has generally been 
sacrificed to meet the short-term financial imperative of reducing public expenditure.  Not 
surprisingly the central states ability to intervene strategically and effectively has been, as a 
result, consistently compromised.  
It is however interesting to note that whenever this policy approach has been challenged, most 
notably by key service delivery organisations armed with a more robust evidential base, the 
government has had to consistently backed down. The NHS Listening exercise was the longest 
public consultation ever undertaken by a modern British government, yet the government 
announced its agreement to every single recommendation of the NHS Future Forum on the 
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same day as it received the forums second set of reports. Similarly the Police and the Fire and 
Rescue Services have consistently called for the retention of national databases and their 
sectors improvement infrastructure.  
It is very tempting to assume that the common purpose and sophisticated improvement 
infrastructure that was generated and maintained through the labour years, may have been 
dependent on a particular set of circumstances or actors unique to England at an historical 
juncture. However evidence from as close as Scotland (Scottish Government 2011, 2012) 
suggests that while the detailed nuances of the agenda may have been shaped by English 
situational factors, the  key objectives, concepts and characteristics of the strategic state are 
more robust and replicable.     
It would appear that the demands for more strategic state intervention in local public services 
in the UK have not abated, it is the conceptualisation and delivery of that intervention that has 
proved problematic for a coalition government that wishes to prioritise short term reductions 
in public expenditure and neo-liberal market solutions to public service reform. In Scotland the 
National Performance Framework and the new Single Outcome Agreements from the devolved 
administration are attempting to build on the earlier English experience and achieve buy-in not 
only from within the government and public services but also from key organisations outside of 
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The development of the strategic state’s performance management 
arrangements 1997-2010 
              
                1.Within Central Government i.e. between the ‘centre of government’ and the  
‘spending departments’ of central government 
Comprehensive Spending Reviews (budget allocations) and Public Service Agreements 
(performance objectives and targets).  
               2. Between Central and Local Government 
a) Top down performance management regimes (Best Value, Comprehensive Performance 
Assessments, Comprehensive Area Assessments)  
"To put in place and effective strategic management system, central agencies must act as a central 
leadership hub in order to facilitate co-ordination, collaboration and co-operation across the public 
administration, with the objective of securing a strong, coherent and collective strategic vision of 
where the country needs to go and how it will get there. Centres of Government are the focal point 
for the strategic state and are essential for leadership, steering, stewardship, oversight and 
accountability." 
Source: OECD 2012 Session Brief for OECD Global Forum on Public Governance November 2012. 
Paris.  
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